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Comment
Surviving the View Through the Lochner
Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the Case for
Upholding Development Moratoria
Dan Herber*
INTRODUCTION
Around twenty-five million years ago, the Sierra Nevada
Mountains thrust out of the earth and formed the Lake Tahoe
Basin.' The basin filled with melting snow, and lava flows
locked the crystal clear 2 waters in a 191 square mile lake at the
lofty perch of 6225 feet above sea level.3 The natural resources
found in the basin drew Native American tribes to spend sum-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; BA_ 1993,
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse. This Comment benefited from valuable
commentary of Professor Ann Burkhart, Minnesota Law School and the work
of the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review. I thank Carrie Seib for
giving me the joy of her company and love. I dedicate this Comment to my
mother, Mary Herber, for her constant inspiration. All opinions and any er-
rors are my own.
1. GEORGE WHARTON JAMES, LAKE OF THE SKY 57-58 (3d ed. 1992); Don
Lane, The History of Lake Tahoe, at http:/www.trpa.org/tahoestories/wel-
come.html (last visited March 29, 2002).
2. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Nev. 1999) (noting that the lake historically lacked
"nitrogen and phosphorous, two of the nutrients algae requires" to grow). Ob-
servations made by University of California, Berkeley Professor John Le Conte
on September 6, 1873 revealed that the "transparency of the water" exceeded
100 feet. JAMES, supra note 1, at 53.
3. Lane, supra note 1. Lake Tahoe is the tenth deepest lake in the world.
Id. (noting that the lake's "greatest depth is 1645 feet and it averages 1000
feet in depth"). About 501 square miles of land (including that under the
Lake) lie within the Lake Tahoe Basin. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency Govern-
ing Bd., Regional Plan for Lake Tahoe Basin: Goals and Policies, at
http://www.trpa.org/goals/preface.html (last visited March 29, 2002).
914 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:913
mers fishing at the lake.4 In the mid 1800s, the discovery of
gold and silver deposits brought an influx of new settlers to the
basin along with significant natural resource destruction.5
Rapid population growth and land use around Lake Tahoe in
the 1950s and 1960s 6 raised fears that increased development
might diminish the lake's clarity7 and safety.8 As a conse-
quence, local residents, businesspersons, and planners from
California and Nevada (two-thirds of the lake lies within Cali-
fornia, one-third within Nevada) began to call for more "orderly
development" of the basin.9
In 1969, at the urging of the legislatures and governors of
both states, 10 Congress created the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA) by ratifying the Tahoe Regional Planning Com-
pact.1 Despite significant study of the human impacts on the
lake, the 1969 Compact failed to stem the deterioration of the
lake's health. 12 Consequently, in 1980, Congress "restructured
4. DOUGLAS H. STRONG, TAHOE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 8 (1984).
5. Lane, supra note 1 ("Over a 40-year period [after the Comstock Lode
was discovered] nearly two-thirds of all of the basins [sic] forests were re-
moved, and only stumps and unwanted fir trees remained.").
6. STRONG, supra note 4, at 148 (noting that "resident population had
doubled [during the 1960s] ... and state and federal recreation land use had
multiplied eightfold).
7. See Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 ("Dramatic decreases in clar-
ity first began to be noted in the late 1950s/early 1960s, shortly afier develop-
ment at the lake began in earnest in the 1950s. Clarity has decreased steadily
since then."). A 1966 report by the Federal Water Pollution Control Admini-
stration indicated "that the phosphorous level in the lake had reached a criti-
cal level, and that a substantial increase in nitrogen could destroy the clarity
of the lake." STRONG, supra note 4, at 134.
8. STRONG, supra note 4, at 132 (noting that in "1961, some two million
gallons of sewage overflowed from the south shore treatment plant and into
the lake" and that "[t]he situation at the north shore was not much better").
9. Id. at 126-29.
10. California Governor Ronald Reagan, criticized for his early silence on
the issue, did sign California's bill and later praised the Compact. Id. at 142-
44, 148.
11. Id. President Nixon signed the bill creating the TRPA on December
18, 1969. Id. at 144. Only compacts approved by Congress have the force of
law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The TRPA did not represent the first con-
gressional involvement in the area; disputes over water control in the basin
led Congress in 1955 to establish the California-Nevada Interstate Compact
Commission. STRONG, supra note 4, at 108.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1023, at 2 (1980), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON
NAT'L PARKS & INSuLAR AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE
LAKE TAHOE PRESERVATION ACT 11 (Comm. Print 1981) ("Testimony provided
has indicated a general consensus that the hope for [the 1969 Compact's] ap-
proach to solve the environmental degradation problems in the basin has been
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[the] TRPA and its voting procedures, and directed it to estab-
lish environmental threshold carrying capacities and a new re-
gional plan within a strict time table."13 For a period of thirty-
two months, the TRPA implemented moratoria 14 on most resi-
dential and all commercial construction in many areas of the
basin during the creation of a comprehensive development plan
for the basin.15 A group of approximately 400 plaintiffs who
own land in the basin sued the TRPA claiming the agency de-
prived them, through various delays including the moratoria, of
all use of their respective properties while the delays and mora-
toria were in effect. I6 Regardless of any future use or value of
their property, the property owners claim the TRPA's actions
violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 17
The District Court of Nevada found that the moratoria on
development constituted takings subject to compensation under
the Fifth Amendment. 18 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, reversed these district court takings hold-
ings. 19 The Ninth Circuit declared that the loss of value caused
by a "temporary" taking must be offset by any future use of the
property.20 The court then found the property owners main-
tained future use value during the moratoria and therefore suf-
fered no taking.21 On June 29, 2001, the United States Su-
preme Court granted limited certiorari to consider "[w]hether
the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary
moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking
unwarranted."). California, concerned about numerous exemptions for un-
sound development in the 1969 Compact, pulled its fimding from the TRPA.
Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
13. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
14. This Comment uses the term "moratoria" throughout to refer to a con-
tinuous development ban imposed by the TRPA through two legislative actions
(Ordinance 81-5, effective from August 24, 1981 through August 26, 1983 and
Resolution 83-21, effective from August 27, 1983 through April 25, 1984). See
id. at 1233-36.
15. See id. at 1234 (citing Defs.' Tr. Br. at 13). The restrictions on Cali-
fornia landowners were greater than on those landowners in Nevada. Id. at
1235.
16. See id. at 1229. Note that a subset of the Nevada plaintiffs did not
have claims against Ordinance 81-5 before the court. Id. at 1245.
17. See id. at 1229.
18. Id. at 1245.
19. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764, 782 (9th Cir. 2000).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution."22
This Comment will examine the leading cases governing
temporary takings and will argue that moratoria, like the ones
in Tahoe-Sierra, operate under state police powers, powers his-
torically not subject to the Takings Clause. Part I examines
the relevant scope of existing takings law with attention given
to its common law origins. Part II inspects the Ninth Circuit's
treatment of the relevant case law and its reliance on the policy
implications of its decision in ruling against the landowners.
Part III analyzes the Rehnquist Court's unprecedented
practice of diminishing the regulatory tools available to gov-
ernment entities to control private property developments that
hurt the environment. It audits the Court's misinterpretation
of a fact-specific 1922 case and scrutinizes its abandonment of
almost two hundred years of takings law. Further, the section
identifies the Court's distrust of legislative and agency actions
as key to understanding the direction of the Rehnquist Court's
heightened scrutiny of government regulations. In addition,
the section identifies the Court's unsupported isolation of nui-
sance principles from their ancient origins and recent statutory
embodiment. Finally, this Comment concludes in Part IV with
an explanation of why the Ninth Circuit's opinion should stand
despite the Rehnquist Court's heightened review of government
actions in takings challenges.
I. THE COMPENSATION DUTY AND SOVEREIGN
POWERS
A. THE FFTH AMENDMENT'S ORIGINS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
The Constitution contains no specific grant of government
power to take private property for public use. Instead, drawing
22. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 121
S. Ct. 2589, 2589-90 (2001) (mem.). Recognizing the redundancy of terms,
this Comment refers to "temporary moratoria" simply as "moratoria" through-
out. See Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 780 n.21 ("We acknowledge that, given that
moratoria are, by definition, temporary, it is redundant to refer to a morato-
rium as a 'temporary moratorium.'); GLOssARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT,
AND PLANNING TERMS 149 (Michael Davidson & Fay Dolnick eds., 1999) (not-
ing the "temporary" nature of a "moratorium"). The Court heard oral argu-
ment in the case in January 2002. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Tahoe-
Sierra No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002), http'//www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts.html.
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from the tradition in England,23 the Framers tacitly accepted
the power of the sovereign to seize private property.24 The
Framers' acceptance explains why the Fifth Amendment
merely "confirms... 'a tacit recognition of a pre-existing
power."'25 In contrast to the English tradition, however, the
Framers expressly mandated compensation in certain circum-
stances: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."26 In 1897, the Supreme Court held
this clause, commonly called the Takings Clause, applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 7 Combined, the implicit power to take private
property for public use and the duty to compensate define the
concept known as eminent domain.28
23. The actual origin of the concept of eminent domain is "lost in obscu-
rity." JULIuS L. SAcKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.2[1], at 1-68
(rev. 3d ed. 2001). An early version of the eminent domain concept appeared
as early as the Athenian Constitution in Greece. See id.
24. Differing rationales for this power exist: The sovereign retains an im-
plied reservation to retake in the initial warrant of land; the power is a rem-
nant of the feudal system established by William of Normandy in the eleventh
century where all land was held subservient to the sovereign and subject to
tenurial payments; and the inherent power of the state is "necessary to the
very existence of government." JESSE DuKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 89, 187, 1102-03 (4th ed. 1998).
25. Id. at 1102 (quoting United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241
(1946)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The English tradition, followed to this day in
England, requires no compensation for private land takings but in the eight-
eenth century, voluntary government compensation was common. Such volun-
tary compensation remains common. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at
1102-03; see also id. at 1092 & n.47 (noting that the Town and Country Plan-
ning Act of 1947 paid landowners because the Act took away "their right to
develop the land [in totol," but that "[playments from the fund were not called
'compensation,' but rather 'ex gratia payments,' because the [English govern-
ment] ... would not admit that... any compensation at all was payable").
27. EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., 1 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 6.02, at 6-4 & n.2 (West Group 4th ed. 2001) (1956) (citing
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
Note that "by the time the [Constitution] was held to require compensation by
the states, they were already providing it on their own-through constitu-
tional or judge-made law." DUEEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1102.
28. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999). The term is attrib-
uted to the seventeenth century legal scholar Grotius. Id. (citing JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrMUTIONAL LAW § 11.11, at 424-25 (4th
ed. 1991)).
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B. THE POLICE POWER
The Supreme Court also recognizes state police power.29
Police power antedates the Constitution and historically consti-
tuted regulatory power not subject to the Takings Clause's re-
quirement of compensation. 30 The power reflects "one of the
most essential powers of government, one that is the least lim-
itable."31 A state's police power "aims directly to secure and
promote the public welfare, and it does so by restraint or com-
pulsion."32 Through its police power a state may "regulate the
relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction as to
guard the public morals, the public safety, and the public
health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the
common good."33 Under this power citizens are bound "to the
rule of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners; and
to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective
stations."34
Police powers and eminent domain differ in that "[elminent
domain takes property because it is useful to the public,"
whereas the "police power regulates the use of property or im-
pairs the rights in property because the free exercise of these
rights is detrimental to public interest."35 In other words, emi-
29. The concept of the police power traces back to at least the year 1187.
STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 3-2, at 218 (Lexis Publ'g 2d ed.
2001). Scholars, however, note evidence of state restrictions on property trace
back at least to the fourth century B.C.E. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE
LAW § 1.01, at 1 (Lexis Law Publ'g 4th ed. 1997) ('The Roman Twelve Ta-
bles... included building site restrictions."). This term was first used by the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827).
EAGLE, supra, § 3-4, at 221. Three years earlier, the Supreme Court had
noted "[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate i_ s police, its domestic
trade, and to govern its own citizens." Id. (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824)).
30. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 252-54 (1897).
31. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 1178 (quoting ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 3, at 3 (1904)).
33. 3 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.02, at 16-
39 n.1 (quoting House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911)). A state must, how-
ever, 'tak[e] care always that the means devised [to implement its powers] do
not go beyond the necessities of the case, have some real or substantial rela-
tion to the objects to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent with its own
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States.' Id. (quoting Mayes,
219 U.S. at 282).
34. EAGLE, supra note 29, § 3-2, at 218-19 (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *162).
35. 3 ROHAN, supra note 33, § 16.0213], at 16-58 n.42 (emphasis added)
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nent domain applies to press private property into public use
whereas police regulatory power denies certain private uses to
prevent or stop a public harm.36 Most courts broadly interpret
public harms to include even those offending only aesthetic
sensibilities. 37 States employ two important related but dis-
tinct land use controls under the police power authority: public
nuisance actions and statutory controls.38
1. Common Law Nuisance Actions and Takings
A word of French derivation,39 the term "nuisance" means
"literally annoyance; in law it signifies, according to Blackstone
'anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage."' 40 Of
common law origin, early English public nuisance cases show
the action was initially used to remove public right of way en-
croachments and then extended to protect invasions of other
public rights.41 The Restatement (Second) of Torts broadly con-
strues a public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public."42 If a land use consti-
tutes a nuisance wherever it is located, it is a nuisance per se; if
it is a nuisance in some locations but not others, it is a nuisance
per accidens.43 Since courts are hesitant to label land uses nui-
sances before they commence, nuisance actions generally serve
(quoting Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354, 356 (Conn. 1920)); see also
FREUND, supra note 32, § 511, at 546-47 ("Mhe state takes property by emi-
nent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power be-
cause it is harmful ....").
36. See SACEMAN, supra note 23, § 1.42[2], at 1-203, 1-212, 1-214.
37. 3 ROHAN, supra note 33, § 16.05, at 16-140 to 16-164. The Supreme
Court adopts the majority view. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) ("It is not speculative to recognize that bill-
boards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be
perceived as an 'esthetic harm.').
38. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
One nineteenth century English nuisance scholar commented that "[tihe
Crown cannot by grant entitle a person to commit a public nuisance, for the
grant must be subject to the rights of the public" and that "a prescriptive title
cannot be obtained to commit a public nuisance." EDMUND W. GARRETr, THE
LAW OF NUISANCES 18 (London, William Clowes & Sons, 2d ed. 1897).
39. VICTOR E. SCHwARTz ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHwARTz's TORTS
802 (10th ed. 2000) [hereinafter PROSSER].
40. 3 ROHAN, supra note 33, § 16.02[2], at 16-55 n.29 (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *216).
41. See GARRETr, supra note 38, at 1; PROSSER, supra note 39, at 802.
42. PROSSER, supra note 39, at 802 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B (1978)).
43. See MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 4.02, at 99.
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as reactive regulatory tools.4 Because of their reactive nature,
common law nuisance actions have been supplanted in many
areas by more proactive statutes, both at the state and federal
levels. 45 This is especially true in the regulation of environ-
mental nuisances. 46 Significantly, as derivative police powers,
nuisance-based regulations and prohibitions historically have
not been subject to the Fifth Amendment's compensation re-
quirement.47
44. See id. § 4.03, at 100; see also J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the
Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 113 (1995)
("Litigation may begin only after the use has begun and the harm felt.").
45. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, & POLICY 101, 106 (3d ed. 2000). Sovereign enactment of public nui-
sance laws is far from a new trend. See GARRETT, supra note 38, at 2 & n.1
(identifying a very early English public nuisance statute regulating air pollu-
tion "and dealing with the improper disposal of garbage in ditches and waters"
(citing 12 Rich. II. c. 13 (Eng.))).
46. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 776-78. Prior to 1970 in
America, few environmental statutes existed and most restricted only the use
of public lands. See PERCIVAL, supra note 45, at 104 (discussing the Multiple-
Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000); Wilderness Act
of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-1287 (2000) (enacted in 1968)). By contrast, the period from 1970 to
1980 marked an explosion in new and significantly amended old federal regu-
lations, many of which affect private property use. Id. at 105-09; see, e.g.,
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y
(2000) (significantly strengthened in 1972); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000) (enacted in 1976); Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994
& Supp. V. 1999) (significantly strengthened in 1972); Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Ocean Dumping Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1445 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f to
300n-5 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 4321-4370e (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (enacted in 1970); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. V.
1999) (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992
(1965)); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (signifi-
cantly strengthened in 1970 and 1977); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994
& Supp. V. 1999); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); Hazardous Materials Transpor-
tation Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). See gener-
ally Kevin Madonna, Note, Federal Environmental Statutes, 13 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 1171 (1996) (listing "all of the major federal environmental laws" with
enactment and amendment dates).
47. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 252-54 (1897); BERNARD H. SEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 75-77
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2. Statutory Nuisance Controls and Takings
Deeply rooted in judge-made law, nuisance actions operate
quite differently from state regulatory land use controls be-
cause all state regulations48 originate as legislative actions (or
administrative actions within legislative parameters).49 The
Framers were familiar with legislative land use regulations;
many legislative land use controls were passed after our coun-
try's independence and before the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment in 1791.50 In 1926, the Supreme Court recognized
the broad scope of land use laws and held modern zoning laws
constitutional.51 The Court used the analogy of the breadth of
the nuisance action to devise the scope of zoning laws.52 Zoning
laws act as a proactive police power tool to prevent harms be-
fore they occur by prohibiting nuisances per accidens from lo-
cating near other land uses they would likely harm. Prior to
1922, statutory regulations, like nuisance actions before them,
received great deference from courts. 53 Early American courts
generally held even those regulations that caused severe dimi-
nution in private property values exempt from the Takings
Clause's compensation requirement. 54
(1997) (noting early English and American courts honored and enlarged the
nuisance exception to takings); ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 27, § 6.08, at 6-35
(noting that under the "harm-prevention or nuisance rationale... a taking
may not be found despite the fact that an owner is denied all economically-
viable use of his land").
48. State restrictions placed on initial state land patents (grants of land
from the government to the first private owners) are not easily classified, but
are considered distinct from statutory regulations. See John F. Hart, Land
Use Law in the Early Republic & the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000), reprinted in 2001 ZONING & PLANNING LAW
HANDBOOK § 3.0311], at 123-24 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001).
49. A proposed use of land consistent with the land's zoning still can be
held a nuisance. See MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 4.10, at 104-05.
50. See Hart, supra note 48, § 3.03[11-[3], at 122-38 (identifying aesthetic,
construction, drainage, lot size, and other restrictive land use laws that defy
the "narrow nuisance-prevention concept of government's regulatory power").
51. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87, 397 (1926).
52. Id. at 387-88.
53. See Robert K. Best, Regulatory Takings: A Brief History, in INVERSE
CONDEMNATION AND RELATED LIABILITY 1, 3-4 (A.L.I.-A.B.4 Course of Study,
May 3-5, 2001) (noting that cases between 1872 and 1922 "followed the princi-
ples that the police power, when used to prevent harm to the community,
could not be a taking and that, even when not harmful, private interests must
yield when they are overshadowed by the good of the community"); Byrne, su-
pra note 44, at 93-94.
54. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-05, 414 (1915)
(denying a writ of habeas corpus to a brickyard owner operating in violation of
2002]
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C. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF LAND USE
RESTRICTIONS: 1922 TO THE PRESENT
1. Justice Holmes and the Birth of Regulatory Takings
Before 1922 the Supreme Court required that compensa-
tion be paid to private property owners only when the govern-
ment engaged in a permanent physical occupation or invasion55
of private property.5 6 In 1922, the Supreme Court handed
down Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.57 The Court held un-
constitutional a Pennsylvania law that required the mining
company to leave a portion58 of the coal it owned in the ground
to act as support for the land's surface.5 9 Justice Holmes, for
an ordinance); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-80 (1915)
(holding a ban on the operation of a livery stable valid); Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240, 255 (1897) (applying the
Fifth Amendment to the states and upholding state laws restricting railroad
property); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657-70 (1887) (upholding a Kansas
ban on a brewery operation).
55. Physical occupation cases are a venerable class of takings. See, e.g.,
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78, 181 (1872) (construing consti-
tutional takings to go beyond just "absolute conversion of real property" to
cover situations "where real estate is actually invaded by [government im-
posed] superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material"). One
hundred ten years later, the Court affirmed Pumpelly and established physical
occupations as per se takings. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). In Loretto, New York law required a land-
lord to permit a cable television company to install its equipment on her build-
ing. Id. at 423. Despite the minimal (and arguably beneficial) alteration of
the property's value, the Court declared that New York owed the owner com-
pensation for a "permanent physical occupation" of her property. Id. at 441.
56. See EAGLE, supra note 29, § 1-1, at 3 ("[U]ntil 1922 the Supreme Court
had observed a de facto bright line test: it had never found governmental ac-
tivities short of a physical occupation to constitute a taking."); sources cited
supra note 53. Before 1922, numerous claims failed to shake the Supreme
Court's broad deference to police power regulations. See cases cited supra note
54.
57. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
58. The defendant would have been required to leave "standing in pillars
from one-fourth to one-third of the coal." Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491,
498 (Pa. 1922) (Kephart, J., dissenting).
59. The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Coal sought to enjoin a coal company
from removing coal owned by the coal company that supported the plaintiffs
land (and house), citing as support the state statute. 260 U.S. at 394. The
Court focused on the unique support estate in land, recognized by Pennsyl-
vania law, that gave the coal company the right to deprive the land surface of
all support whether or not someone else held the surface estate. Id. at 414.
The state enacted the Kohler Act in 1921, which required some coal be left un-
derground to support the surface. Id. at 412. Holmes declared that the Kohler
Act "purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in
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the Court, stated that a regulation that "make[s] it commer-
cially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or de-
stroying it." 60 While Justice Holmes weighed various factors in
assessing the takings claim in Pennsylvania Coal, he articu-
lated no specific test for determining when a police power re-
striction constitutes a taking. In the end, he simply noted
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."61 With these
words, Holmes originated the concept of regulatory takings. 62
2. The Takings Tests
Despite Holmes's pronouncement, however, "[flor the next
[fifty-five] years the Court did little to elaborate on the concept
of a regulatory taking."63 Not until 1978, in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 64 did the Court articulate
a test for regulatory takings. In that case, the owners of Penn
Central Station claimed the city's historic preservation ordi-
nance prevented the use of their air rights above the station
and thus constituted a taking.65 The owners acknowledged
that the ordinance did not impinge on the use of the existing
structure but asked the Court to consider the air rights as a
separate interest that was destroyed by the ordinance. 66 In re-
jecting the claim, the Court identified three primary factors to
be considered while conducting an "ad hoc" evaluation of
whether a police power regulation went "too far": (1) the regula-
tion's economic consequences for the owner; (2) the regulation's
interference with justifiable, "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations"; and (3) the character of the governmental action. 67
land-a very valuable estate." Id. at 414. Unlike most states, Pennsylvania
recognizes three separate estates in land: "[slurface, coal/mineral and the right
to support." Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 719 A.2d 19,
28 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
60. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
61. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
62. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING & CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 80 (5th ed. 2001). Justice Holmes did not pen the term
"regulatory takings," however. See EAGLE, supra note 29, § 1-2, at 4 (noting
that the term did not appear in published cases until the late 1970s).
63. Best, supra note 53, at 4.
64. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
65. Id. at 130.
66. Id. at 129-30.
67. Id. at 124.
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Two years following Penn Central, and without abandoning
the test elaborated in Penn Central, the Court articulated a
two-part takings test in Agins v. City of Tiburon.68 The Court
later affirmed the Agins test in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis.69 Under this test, a taking occurs if (1) the
regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state in-
terests"; or (2) "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."70
3. The Whole Parcel Rule
Notably, unlike Holmes's decision in Pennsylvania Coal,
the Penn Central Court refused to limit its definition of "prop-
erty" to merely the regulated portion or interest in property.71
The Penn Central Court instead declared that takings analysis
"does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated. ' 72
Some scholars refer to the concept of looking at all of the
property involved in all of the interests owned as the "whole
parcel rule."73 If the whole parcel rule lies on one end of a lin-
ear property interest spectrum, segmentation or "conceptual
severance" lies at the opposite end.74 Conceptual severance de-
scribes the process of analyzing less than the entire property
68. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
69. 480 U.S. 470,485 (1987).
70. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (noting that the Court's
analysis "does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments" but instead
evaluates "the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel
as a whole").
72. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). At least one regulatory takings expert
labels this finding "dictum." Steven J. Eagle, Development Moratoria, First
English Principles, and Regulatory Takings, [News & Analysis] 31 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11232, 11233 (Oct. 2001). The Supreme Court later reaf-
firmed its anti-segmentation position. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
73. MANDELKER & PAYNE, supra note 62, at 114 (noting that the whole
parcel rule is also called the "denominator rule"); see also ZIEGLER ET AL., su-
pra note 27, § 6.08[7], at 6-68 (noting that the concept is also the "so-called
Hohfeldian theory of taking analysis").
74. The term "conceptual severance" as applied to takings law first ap-
peared in 1988. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676
(1988) (explaining that the concept involves "delineating a property interest
consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner,
and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently
taken").
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holdings of the property owner-usually only one property in-
terest or only a portion of an interest (e.g., the regulated por-
tion).7 5
Beginning early in the last century, legal thinkers meta-
phorically described a person's estate as a "bundle" of rights or
a "bundle of sticks."76 The "bundle" represents multiple ab-
stract "legal relations between persons with respect to a
thing.77 Some of these rights, like the right to possess, to use,
to exclude others from, or to transfer property, comprise "fun-
damental element[s"7 8 or "sticks" within the estate bundle.79
The wholesale appropriation of one of the above "sticks" by the
government may trigger the Fifth Amendment's compensation
requirement.8 0 More recent theories of conceptual severance
suggest that, besides the traditional property "sticks," an estate
may be divided along at least three planes of property interests:
vertical (e.g., mineral, surface, air rights), horizontal (e.g., indi-
vidual contiguous parcels considered separately or one parcel
broken into separate types of land such as wetlands or up-
lands), and temporal (e.g., January, February, March or 1999,
2000, 2001).81
75. See id. Conceptual severance goes by other names as well. See, e.g.,
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
774 (9th Cir. 2000) (using "denominator problem"); MANDELKER & PAYNE, su-
pra note 62, at 149 (using the terms "denominator rule" and "segmentation");
cf. Brief Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation & California Association of
Realtors, Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002) (noting that
"virtually any real-world property interest can be" transformed into a larger,
more abstract concept through 'conceptual merge[r]'," 'conceptual agglomera-
tion'," or 'conceptual composition'" (citations omitted)), 2001 WL 1082473 at
*6 & n.4.
76. See ABI Real Estate Committee, A Round Table Discussion: Supreme
Court Decision 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 7 AM1. BANKR. INsT. L. REV.
389, 399 n.26 (1999).
77. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 201.
78. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
79. Id. at 179-80.
80. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987) (finding a taking
where a regulation terminated the right to pass property to heirs); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (finding a tak-
ing where a regulation infringed on the right to exclude); Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 179-80 (requiring the government to compensate the landowner for
regulation restricting the right to exclude). But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65-66 (1979) (holding that regulations barring the sale of eagle feathers did
not violate the Takings Clause because the owners could still possess, trans-
port, donate or devise the feathers and the potential economic benefit of the
feathers remained).
81. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
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Commentators often identify Holmes's opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Coal'as adopting a conceptual severance analytical
framework.8 2 Seemingly counter to the whole parcel rule, the
idea of Holmes's conceptual severance in Pennsylvania Coal
continues to be debated heavily in regulatory takings cases.8 3
Because Penn Central adopted Holmes's belief that regulatory
actions that go "too far"8 4 are compensable, the "too far" deter-
mination in large part rests on whether the regulated property
encompasses all or some of the severed property.8 5
4. "Temporary" Regulatory Takings
The Court touched upon a temporal severance aspect of
regulatory takings cases in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.8 6 The question
before the Court was whether the Takings Clause required
compensation for the time period during which land was regu-
lated (from the time the regulation began until the time at
which the regulation was held unconstitutional).8 7 The Court
also chose to discuss the validity of such "temporary" takings.88
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 330 (1987) ("Regulations are three dimensional; they have
depth, width, and length.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See DUKEMINTER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1157; MANDELKER &
PAYNE, supra note 62, at 84.
83. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1157.
84. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
85. Expressed mathematically, it becomes clearer why the whole parcel
rule is also called the denominator problem:
"[A] court must compare the loss of property use resulting from a
regulation, x, to the sum of all usage rights inherent in a piece of
property, y. If x/y equals 1, then a taking has occurred; if x/y is some-
thing less than 1, the property owner is entitled to nothing. If the
relevant property interest, y, is defined narrowly enough, as, for ex-
ample, only those rights that have been regulated away, then a taking
will always have occurred ... On the other hand, if the relevant prop-
erty interest is defined broadly enough, a regulatory taking will never
occur."
Machinpongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 719 A.2d 19, 25 n.12
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting John E. Fee, Com-
ment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CIHI.
L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1994)).
86. 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (finding that retroactive determinations of
takings are compensable).
87. Id. at 310-11; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1176
("The Supreme Court's decision in First English was limited to the question of
remedy if a regulatory taking occurs.").
88. See First English, 482 U.S. at 318 ("These cases reflect the fact that
'temporary' takings' which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property,
are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
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The Court stated, "[Wihere the government's activities have al-
ready worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent ac-
tion by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive."89 Finally, the Court noted, "We limit our holding to the
facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite differ-
ent questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, vari-
ances, and the like which are not before us."90
5. The Categorical Regulatory Taking and Resurrection of the
Common Law Nuisance Exception
In 1992, the Court followed First English with Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, a case that raises the stakes
for the government when a court allows the conceptual sever-
ance of the property in question.91 In Lucas, Justice Scalia es-
tablished for the first time that a regulation that "deprives land
of all economically beneficial use" constitutes a taking regard-
less of any other factors and is therefore a compensable gov-
ernment action.92 Consequently, if the land interest (the de-
nominator) is defined as the portion of the land regulated by
the statute (the numerator), the land will be deemed devoid of
all use, and thus a taking.93
The Lucas Court did, however, recognize the so-called nui-
sance exception as an affirmative government defense to the
finding of an automatic taking by a court.9 4 The Court delim-
ited the nuisance defense: "[Wie think [a state] may resist com-
pensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the na-
ture of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with."95 This state-
clearly requires compensation.").
89. Id. at 321. Courts label takings of the First English ilk "retrospec-
tively temporary." See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Nev. 1999) (quoting Woodbury
Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992)); Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 873 (Fla. 2001).
90. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
91. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-17 (1992) (reaffirming the per se takings rule of
"physical 'invasion'" and establishing a per se regulatory takings rule 'where
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land").
92. Id. at 1027.
93. See supra note 85.
94. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30.
95. Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
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ment appears to hark back to the Court's 1897-1922 rulings
that rested on the federalism based concept that the Fifth
Amendment governs the states, but that states retain their
immutable police powers to protect the public from harm.9 6
A number of state cases broadly interpreted Lucas as a no-
tice rule essentially estopping landowner regulatory taking
claims where the suspect statute was in effect when the owner
gained title to the regulated property.97 One court stated that
it could "discern no sound reason to isolate the [nuisance excep-
tion] inquiry to some arbitrary earlier time in the evolution of
the common law" because to do so "would elevate common law
over statutory law, and would represent a departure from the
established understanding that statutory law may trump an
inconsistent principle of the common law."98
6. The Nuisance Exception to Categorical Takings Narrows
Following Lucas, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted
a variation of the statutory-nuisance-as-notice rule and used it
to bar consideration of a "'reasonable investment-backed expec-
tation['" claim under the Penn Central three-pronged test.99
The Rhode Island court stated that a property owner who re-
ceived title to property after a regulation's enactment could not
96. See id. at 1027 (noting that '[als long recognized, some values are en-
joyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power" (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922));
Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, in
TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AF R
DOLAiv AND LucAs 110 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) ("With this one bold stroke,
the Court .... had seemingly returned the land-use power to its roots, as a
reasonable codification of the.., law of nuisance."); supra notes 29-38 and ac-
companying text.
97. See EAGLE, supra note 29, § 12-1(c)(1), at 951 ("[Aflost courts that
have examined the matter have determined that a recently promulgated regu-
lation both inheres in the title and affects the expectations of subsequent buy-
ers."); MANDELKER & PAYNE, supra note 62, at 150 ("Several cases [since Lu-
cas] held the exception includes other common law principles as well as
statutes and local regulations .... ").
98. Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1997). But see
EAGLE, supra note 29, § 12-1(c)(4), at 961 ("[T]he generalized invocation of
public interests in the state constitution, and the Legislature's declarations ...
do not constitute background principles of nuisance and property law suffi-
cient to prohibit the use of plaintiffs' land without just compensation." (quot-
ing K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 575 N.W.2d 531
(Mich. 1998))).
99. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001) (quoting Pa-
lazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000)).
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find aid in the Takings Clause "because the landowner is con-
strained by those 'restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.'" 1oo The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case and in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island addressed the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court's pre-existing-regulation bar to the takings
claim.101 Justice Kennedy, for the Court, stated bluntly, "A law
does not become a background principle for subsequent owners
by enactment itself."102 Palazzolo appears to support the view
that the nuisance exception to Lucas refers primarily to com-
mon law "background principles" recognized before Lucas was
handed down. 103
D. CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A REGULATORY
TAKEING CLAIM
While takings law remains muddled, 1°4 post-Palazzolo
regulatory taking analysis contains an identifiable regimen. 10 5
The Supreme Court always follows an ad-hoc evaluation proc-
ess of the record. 106 If the regulation results in permanent
physical occupation or invasion of recognized property inter-
ests, the landowner must be compensated. 10 7 If the regulation
100. Id. at 2464 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029 (1992)).
10L See id.
102. Id.
103. See James S. Burling, Protecting Property Rights in Ecologically Valu-
able Resources After Palazzolo, in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED
LIABILITY, supra note 53, at 109, 130-34; Wendie L. Kellington, New Takes on
Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, in LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING,
REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 511, 529
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Aug. 16-18, 2001) ("Palazzolo makes clear that
the kind of background principles of state law referred to in [the] Lucas con-
text, however, are limited.").
104. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (noting that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government").
105. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2466 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have
'identified several factors that have particular significance' in these 'essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries. ' (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124)).
106. See id.
107. Compensation must also be paid if the right to exclude is trammeled
(although the distinction between the right to exclude and physical invasion
seems blurred, either seems to implicate the other). See Loretto v. Telepromp-
ter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982). The destruction of
the right to pass property to heirs also requires compensation. See Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987).
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does not bear on the physical invasion or occupation of the
property, then Lucas must be applied to determine whether the
regulation creates an economic taking per se.108 Key to the
analysis under Lucas will be whether a court accepts concep-
tual severance of the various property interests involved.' °9
Once a court identifies the relevant property interest (the de-
nominator), the regulatory effect (the numerator) must be cal-
culated. 110 If the ratio created equals one, Lucas demands that
a categorical taking be declared."1 For example, assume a leg-
islature bans all use of fifty of one hundred acres of a land-
owner's land. The restricted property, here the fifty acres,
comprises the numerator. If a court equates the fifty acres
with the denominator, then a ratio of one results and a taking
will be found. The government may then offer an affirmative
nuisance defense. 12 To succeed, any nuisance defense must
rely on background principles traditionally found in common
law.U3
If, on the other hand, a court determines the denominator
to equal the total one hundred acres, a ratio of one half exists.
In the hypothetical above, the regulation spares some use of the
relevant property interest (the one hundred acres), so the Penn
Central-Agins amalgam test must be applied to that interest.'1 4
Consequently, a court will likely find a taking if (1) the regula-
tion "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests;"
or (2) "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."115
This two-part test will be informed by at least three of the fac-
tors noted in Penn Central: (1) the economic impact on the
property owner; (2) the owner's discrete investment-backed ex-
pectations; and (3) the nature of the government activity. 16 A
court should also consider the extent to which the regulation
108. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
109. See supra note 85.
110. See supra note 85.
111. See supra note 85.
112. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1248 (D. Nev. 1999); Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801
So. 2d 864, 875 (Fla. 2001).
113. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2001) (referencing
specific pages from Lucas that encapsulate the Court's concept of background
principles as "those common, shared understandings of permissible limitations
derived from a State's legal tradition").
114. Best, supra note 53, at 10.
115. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
116. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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resembles a nuisance action.1 17 If these factors weigh on the
side of the government, no taking is found.118
II. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. V.
TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY
A. THE LANDOWNERS' CLAIMS AND DISTRICT COURT ACTION
Following the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's (TRPA)
prohibition on development from 1981 through 1984, the TRPA
adopted a comprehensive land use plan for the Lake Tahoe Ba-
sin.119 On the day of the 1984 plan's adoption, however, the
state of California sued the TRPA, claiming the plan did not go
far enough to protect Lake Tahoe. 120 Pursuant to that lawsuit,
a federal judge immediately enjoined the TRPA from imple-
menting the plan.12' The injunction decreed a total ban on de-
velopment in the basin and remained in place until the adop-
tion of the 1987 plan.122 Many of the plaintiffs essentially claim
that they suffer under a continuing categorical taking of their
property dating back to the enactment of the first development
moratorium in 1981.123
The district court in Tahoe-Sierra held the TRPA owed the
plaintiffs compensation for the moratoria period during the
years 1981-1984.124 Further, the district court held the land-
owners' claims lacked the causal proof necessary to make the
TRPA responsible for the court-imposed development injunc-
tion from 1984-1987.125 Finally, the lower court held the land-
117. See id. at 125.
118. Id. at 123-28.
119. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (D. Nev. 1999).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he injunction remained in force until a
completely revised land-use plan-the 1987 Regional Plan-was adopted.").
123. This Comment uses the term "claim" here in the common sense to
mean that many of the plaintiffs believe they are owed money for this time pe-
riod; some of the plaintiffs' legal "claims" for portions of this time period no
longer legally exist. See id. at 769-70 nn.5-7 (noting the dismissal of some of
the plaintiffs' claims for some of the time periods covered by the lawsuit).
124. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
125. Id. at 1248 ("There is no evidence whatsoever to support the plaintiffs'
theory that TRPA secretly wanted an injunction ... and deliberately passed a
2002]
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owners' claims from 1987 to the day of the decision to be barred
by the statute of limitations. 126
B. NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSES DISTRICT COURT ON MORATORIA
TIME PERIOD
The Ninth Circuit agreed the 1984-present takings argu-
ments were flawed and affirmed the district court's rejection of
these claims. 127 The Ninth Circuit rejected, however, the dis-
trict court's holding that the 1981-1984 development moratoria
amounted to takings under the Fifth Amendment. 128
The lower court held the moratoria did not violate the Penn
Central balancing test,129 but did constitute a categorical taking
under the test laid out in Lucas.130 The Ninth Circuit noted
that, on appeal, the plaintiffs did not "argue that [the morato-
ria] constitute[d] a taking under the ad hoc balancing approach
described in Penn Central."131 In addition, the plaintiffs
brought only a facial takings claim against the TRPA's morato-
ria.132 Therefore, the court considered neither whether the
moratoria violated the three-prong Penn Central test nor
whether, as applied, the regulations violated the Takings
Clause.
In its review of the moratoria, the court first noted that de-
spite the categorical test set forth in Lucas, the balancing of
"public and private interests" set forth in Penn Central remains
the dominant test for a regulatory taking analysis. 133 The court
stressed that Lucas stands for the proposition "that it is 'rela-
deficient regional plan in order to provoke... an injunction.").
126. Id. at 1238 ("Subsequent to the most recent remand, we held that the
plaintiffs' § 1983 claims as to the 1987 Plan ... were ... barred by the appro-
priate § 1983 statutes of limitations in both Nevada and California.").
127. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 789.
128. Id. at 782.
129. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (noting that "with all three of the
Penn Central factors, at least to some extent, weighing against a finding that
TRPA's actions constituted a partial taking" only a total taking under the Lu-
cas test will allow a taking to be found).
130. Id. at 1245.
131. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773. At oral arguments before the Supreme
Court, the counsel for the landowners conceded that they "did not present a
Penn Central case." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 11 (italics
added).
132. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773.
133. Id. at 772 (noting that "the Supreme Court and lower courts have in-
dicated that most regulatory takings cases should be resolved" using the Penn
Central test).
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tively rare' that government 'regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land."' 134
C. NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
Further, while the court recognized the birth of the concep-
tual severance concept in Pennsylvania Coal, it commented,
"most modern case law rejects the invitation of property hold-
ers to engage in conceptual severance."135 In particular, the
court cited the 1978 Penn Central and 1987 Keystone Bitumi-
nous Supreme Court decisions as representative of the aban-
donment of conceptual severance in favor of the whole parcel
rule in reviewing land regulations. 136 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the landowners' claims relied on carving out (i.e., con-
ceptually severing) the period of time of the moratoria's dura-
tion from the entire fee interest each held and thus ran counter
to the Supreme Court's "general rule against conceptual sever-
ance."
137
For purposes of takings analysis, the court saw temporarily
restricting the entire fee interest as "conceptually no different"
from permanently restricting the development of a small por-
tion of a whole parcel. 138 Both restrictions diminished the time
or land available for use, but some present land value remained
for the portion of time or land not covered by the restriction.139
Additionally, the court found that requiring compensation for
moratoria-widely used planning tools-ran counter to the Lu-
cas Court's statement that only rarely would land use restric-
tions constitute categorical takings.140
Finally, the court specifically addressed the plaintiffs'
claim that, on the facts before the court, First English required
conceptual severance along the temporal property plane.141
First English, the Ninth Circuit rebutted, stands for the limited
proposition that after a regulation is found to be a taking, the
134. Id. at 777 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015,
1018 (1992)).
135. Id. at 774.
136. Id. at 774-775 (identifying the Supreme Court's "general rule against
conceptual severance").
137. Id.
138. Id. at 776.
139. See id. at 777 ("There is no plausible basis on which to distinguish"
devaluation caused by vertical severance from "a similar diminution in value
that results from a temporary suspension of development.").
140. Id.
141. Id.
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landowner must be compensated for the retroactive period be-
tween the enactment of the regulation and the court decision. 142
The district court relied on First English to distinguish lengthy
delays like the thirty-two month moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra
from "'normal delays'" in receiving building permits and zoning
changes, and thus held the moratoria to be takings. 143 The
Ninth Circuit replied that First English's brief discussion of
normal delays represented dictum since only the remedial issue
of damages was before the Supreme Court in that case. 14
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit stated that planners use land use
moratoria to provide for orderly review of proposed zoning
changes, and therefore First English's normal delays language
"appears to encompass temporary planning moratoria."145
Here, the court found the record reflected TRPA's intent to
keep the moratoria in place "only until a new regional land-use
plan could be adopted";146 therefore the landowners, during the
moratoria, maintained their interest in the future use (a use
commencing with the adoption of the plan) of their property.147
Because the Ninth Circuit found that no categorical taking oc-
curred, the court did not address the district court's treatment
of the government's affirmative nuisance defense set forth in
Lucas.
III. TAHOE-SIERRA AND THE REHNQUIST COURTS
TAKE ON TAKINGS
Understanding Tahoe-Sierra's probable fate before the Su-
preme Court requires an understanding of the dramatic
changes in takings law adjudication leading up to and during
Chief Justice Rehnquist's reign. First, the Court revived and
continues to transform Pennsylvania Coal's holding beyond
reasonable factual support.148 Second, the Court resurrected
142. Id. at 778 ("In other words, a permanent regulation leads to a 'tempo-
rary' taking when a court invalidates the ordinance after the taking." (quoting
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 319 (1987))).
143. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1250 (D. Nev. 1999) ("The language in First English
which seems to exempt 'normal delays' in the permitting process clearly does
not include interim moratoria." (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 321)).
144. See Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 778 & n.17.
145. Id. at 779 n.17.
146. Id. at 780.
147. See id. at 780-81.
148. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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and persists in fusing with takings analysis an intense scrutiny
of government actions akin to the much-maligned Lochner
Court. 149 This fusion allows for new review elements to enter
into the Court's analysis of a case. Finally, the Court's treat-
ment of common law nuisance demonstrates a narrowing of the
police powers traditionally afforded states.150 Taken together,
the three elements above reveal the Court's systematic attack
on the types of environmental and land use controls involved in
Tahoe-Sierra and inform the Court's review of the case.
A. PENNSYLVANIA COAL AND CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE: MYTH
As CONVENIENT "REALITY"
In his famed dissent in Lochner v. New York, Justice
Holmes stated, "General propositions do not decide concrete
cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise."151 Seventeen
years after Lochner, under the power of Holmes's pen, the Su-
preme Court handed down Pennsylvania Coal, a case exempli-
fying just such a narrowly tailored opinion.152 Yet, despite
Holmes's sagacious words, today a movement inadvertently be-
gun in Penn Central to articulate Pennsylvania Coal's limited
holding as a major premise remains afoot. 153 In Tahoe-Sierra,
for instance, the Ninth Circuit traced the lineage of the plain-
tiffs' temporal severance claim back to Pennsylvania Coal.154
This exercise fails to place Pennsylvania Coal in its proper
place in judicial history. The peculiar facts of the case drew a
peculiar response from Holmes and should be tucked safely
away in the ephemera file of the Supreme Court Librarian.
1. A Peculiar Case
Indeed, the factual eccentricities of Pennsylvania Coal pro-
vide a weak foundation for conceptual severance in a takings
149. See discussion infra Part LI.B.
150. See discussion infra Part III.C.
151. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that the
distinction between eminent domain and police power "depends upon the par-
ticular facts").
153. See WILLIAM A. FIScHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGs 49 (1995) ("Legal
scholars ... who claim[] that Holmes was engaging in 'conceptual severance,'
have let the urgency of their causes ... get in the way of a fair reading of the
opinion.").
154. See Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 774, 778.
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claim action. First, the government was not even a named
party in the suit.155 Second, the coal company, not Mahon, was
the defendant. 56 Third, the coal company defended against
Mahon's "bill in equity," and the company appealed Pennsyl-
vania's grant of injunctive relief: No issue of damages pre-
sented itself,157 nor could any damages have been granted. 58
Fourth, evidence of the defendant coal company's collusion with
the plaintiff in bringing the famed suit calls into question
whether any justiciable issue was even before the Court.159
Fifth, even the courts of Pennsylvania recognize the "right to
support" estate in land as "unique" to that state. 60 Therefore,
Holmes did not unilaterally sever the support estate from the
fee interest; he merely deferred to Pennsylvania's common law
development of the estate.' 61 Sixth, Holmes made explicit his
view that Pennsylvania Coal was "the case of a single private
house" and damage to that house was "not common or pub-
lic."'162
2. Holmes's Limited Holding
Because Holmes surmised that damage to the house was
not public, he believed the Kohler Act clothed the state's emi-
155. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 393. The State and the City of Scranton, Penn-
sylvania, did submit briefs, however. Id. at 414.
156. Id. at 412.
157. Id. at 412-13.
158. See FISCHEL, supra note 153, at 15 ("Monetary damages, the usual
remedy for a taking, could not have been sought by the coal company because
it had originally been sued by a private party.").
159. See id. at 18.
160. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 719 A.2d 19, 28
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
161. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (noting that the statute "purports to
abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land").
162. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). Some question whether Holmes's as-
sessment of the facts accurately reflects the state of affairs in Pennsylvania in
the 1920s, however. See FIScHEL, supra note 153, at 25-26. Still, for purposes
of analyzing the opinion's precedential value, what Holmes thought the facts
were is more important than what they actually were. See id. at 46 ("[G]iven
Holmes's understanding of the facts, his opinion is a paradigm of judicial rea-
soning."). Following this view, at least one member of the Rehnquist Court,
Justice Stevens, reads Holmes's treatment of the statute as dictum. See Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,406-07 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (labeling
as "dictum" Holmes's "so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine"); Keystone Bi-
tuminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987) (calling
Holmes's comments on the validity of the Kohler Act "an advisory opinion").
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nent domain power in police power garb. 163 The Justice op-
posed allowing the broad police power-to protect the public
from harm-to intermingle with the state's eminent domain
authority to seize private property for public use, subject to
compensation. 164 When Holmes refers, then, to a "regulation"
that "goes too far," the "regulation" is one that physically
seizes-through eminent domain-private property for public
use and not a regulation enacted to protect the public from
harm.165
Additionally, to the extent that Holmes's views did enter-
163. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 ("When [the duty to compensate] is
found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human na-
ture is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears."). Preceding this quote Holmes analogized the Kohler Act to the
state purchasing land for a street-a clear indication that he viewed the stat-
ute as an exercise not of the police power but of eminent domain. See id.
164. See id. Holmes's reversal opinion closely follows the logic of the dis-
sent of the lower court that the statute transferred the coal company's prop-
erty rights to a third private party for its use. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A.
491, 498 (Pa. 1922) (Kephart, J., dissenting) ("The Kohler Act takes [the]
property right from [the] defendant and vests it in [the] plaintiff without com-
pensation."). The lower court dissent criticized the Fowler Act, passed the
same day as the Kohler Act, which allowed Pennsylvania Coal, now enjoined,
to mine the coal under the plaintiffs house provided the company agreed to
pay the legislature two percent of all the tonnage removed. Id. at 498-99
("Payment to the [government] is not restricted to coal taken from under
[plaintiffs property], nor does it matter how deep the coal or how unlikely sub-
sidence would affect the surface."). In addition, the legislature singled out an-
thracite subsidence, but did nothing to regulate bituminous, fire clay, or other
mineral mining subsidence. Id. at 500. Thus, the dissent concluded that no
public harm was implicated by the Kohler Act, which served as a mere pre-
tense for "the real purpose of the Legislature and the framers of the act.., in
the interest of property, and property alone-not to prevent the 'terrible men-
ace to human life, public safety and morals.'" Id. at 499. The dissent called
the legislature's separation of the Kohler Act from the Fowler Act "a mere sub-
terfuge to create the Kohler law a valid act under [the police power]." Id.
165. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Because Holmes viewed the injunctive
relief sought by the plaintiff as an individualized application of the statute, he
saw the statute as protecting only one individual from harm, not the public at
large. See id. at 414. Therefore, the state's police power could not be used and
left only eminent domain power. See generally supra Part IA-B. Importantly,
Holmes cites as an example of an exception to the duty to compensate a law
that allows blowing up (i.e., physically occupying) a house to stop the spread of
fire (i.e., harm). See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16. In other words, he cites a
possessory taking (commonly understood to be a taking since Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 178, 182 (1871)) as an exception to the obligation
to compensate for private property taken for public use (eminent domain). See
id. Thus, suggesting that Holmes used the word "regulation" to include stat-
utes affecting non-possessory interests renders his possessory taking exception
meaningless.
20021 937
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:913
tain the idea of the government as a real party, they confirm he
intended only to distinguish qualified regulations for public use
(eminent domain) from unqualified regulations protecting the
public from harm (police power).1 66 This interpretation fits
comfortably with his vote four years later recognizing the broad
scope of zoning laws established under the police power.1 67
This understanding of Holmes's fact-sensitive, eighty-year-
old judgment places the opinion squarely within the Framers'
intent that only private property seized for public use required
compensation. 168 Pennsylvania Coal served as Holmes's tool to
remind the states not to forget the contemporary understand-
ing of the difference between statutes transferring possessory
property rights to the government or to third parties and those
protecting the public from harm-the former required compen-
sation, the latter none. 169 Therefore, the opinion affirmed (al-
beit on atypical facts) the separation of the treatment of the
eminent domain duty from the police power.
3. A Revisionist View of Holmes's Holding
More bizarre factual adaptation of contemporary law than
revered progenitor of conceptual severance, one wonders why
166. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in upholding the Kohler Act,
found the bill in equity "may be viewed as moving the court to enforce a gen-
eral rule of public policy, intended for the protection of the whole community,
rather than as acting simply for their own protection." Mahon, 118 A. at 495.
In a letter to a friend dated just twenty days after Pennsylvania Coal was de-
cided, Holmes wrote,
My ground is that the public only got on to this land by paying for it
and that if they saw fit to pay only for a surface right they can't en-
large it because they need it now any more than they could have
taken the right of being there in the first place. Perhaps it would
have been well if I had emphasized more the distinction between the
rights of the public in places where their right to be there is unquali-
fied and their right where they only get any locus standi by a transac-
tion that renounced what they now claim.
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 109 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961).
Holmes writes as if the government, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, sold
land underneath its building, then "renounced" that land sale contract and
claimed ownership of the sold land. See id.
167. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87, 397 (1926).
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Butler comprised the dissent. Id. at
397. The remaining majority included Chief Justice Taft and Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Sutherland (author), Sanford and Stone. RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
MODERN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW, at lvii-lix (6th ed. 2000).
168. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 56. This reading recognizes Holmes's reliance on the
facts as laid out in the lower court's dissenting opinion. See supra note 164.
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the Supreme Court allows Pennsylvania Coal to haunt its hal-
lowed chambers.170 One reason might be that Holmes holds a
special place in American legal history.171
A more likely answer lies in the misinterpretation of his
opinion. Some confusion exists as to what Holmes actually said
about conceptual severance versus what the dissent says
Holmes said. 172 At least one Supreme Court opinion subse-
quent to Pennsylvania Coal equates Holmes's majority view to
the opposite of Justice Brandeis's dissent.7 3 This is simply in-
correct; for instance, Holmes did not "anywhere in his opinion
argu[e] that if one stick in the bundle of property is extin-
guished that fact alone makes it a taking."174 In fact, given the
question before the Court, most of the opinion exists only as
dictum.175
Further, the opinion of Holmes as retold by Brandeis's dis-
sent serves the Rehnquist Court's takings adjudication much
like the opinion in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
170. The decision received extensive attention in Penn Central and men-
tion in other recent cases. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448,
2457, 2462 (2001); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1014, 1026, 1028 n.15 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316, 322 (1987).
171. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at ix (1992)
("Oliver Wendell Holmes is the most illustrious figure in the history of Ameri-
can law." (footnote omitted)).
172. See FISCHEL, supra note 153, at 49 ("Brandeis was swinging pretty
wildly at Holmes ....").
173. Justice Brennan in Penn Central appears to have initiated this belief.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 & n.27 (1978)
(listing three cases letting stand laws regulating portions of fee interests and
noting "[tihese cases dispose of any contention that might be based on [Penn-
sylvania Coal], that full use of air rights... irrespective of the impact of the
restriction on the value of the parcel as a whole-constitutes a 'taking). But
blame lies equally with the dissent in Penn Central. See id. at 149 n.13
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Coal as supporting the propo-
sition that "[niot only must the Court define 'reasonable return' for a variety of
types of property... but the Court must define the particular property unit
that should be examined").
174. FISCHEL, supra note 153, at 49.
175. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406-07 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (labeling as "dictum" Holmes's "so-called 'regulatory takings' doc-
trine"); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484
(1987) (calling Holmes's comments on the validity of the Kohier Act "an advi-
sory opinion"); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 118 (2000) (noting the Rehnquist Court's use of"Holmes'[s] dic-
tum").
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States176 serves more purposivist-orientated Courts' statutory
interpretation: as an impenetrable trump card. 177 Each case
invokes vague notions of fairness in law as tools to save private
contractual relationships from statutory control. 178 In Holy
Trinity, Justice Brewer invoked the "spirit" of law to save the
church from an immigration statute's perceived misinterpreta-
tion;179 in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes denounced regulations
that "go[] too far" to save the coal company's support estate, se-
cured through a contract, from a statute's perceived harsh-
ness.180 Both cases share the growing focus on "the subjective,
176. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
177., See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 224 (2000) (noting that "Justice Brennan's majority opinion
[in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)] ... trumped [plain
meaning] with Holy Trinity's" spirit of the law rhetoric); YARBROUGH, supra
note 175, at 118 ("Building on the Holmes dictum in Mahon, the [Rehnquist]
Court has concluded that a variety of zoning controls have imposed such a se-
vere economic hardship on property that the regulation at issue amounted to a
taking for which compensation was required."). This comparison is not meant
to imply the Rehnquist Court uses Pennsylvania Coal to trump plain meaning
of text--just that the Court uses it to trump well-settled notions of takings ju-
risprudence. See id. Further, unlike Holy Trinity, the retold Pennsylvania
Coal fits well the Court's bent on property rights because the trump card al-
ways trumps the government, never the private property owner. See STEPHEN
E. GOTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN
AMERICA 61 (2000). Thus, Pennsylvania Coal resembles less a Hail Mary pass
that can be used for any (non-textual) economic perspective and more a home
field advantage tailored to the Rehnquist Court's property rights views. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 530 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that the imaginative reconstruction al-
lowed by Holy Trinity can be used to "bend[] statutes" to fit conservative or
liberal viewpoints); Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169,
1178 (2000) (describing Holy Trinity as "sort of like the Hail Mary pass in
football").
178. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 ("[U]sually in ordinary private affairs
the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference."); Holy
Trinity, 143 U.S. at 471 (asking the rhetorical question, "In the face of [evi-
dence that America is a Christian nation], shall it be believed that [Congress]
intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for
the services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?").
179. See 143 U.S. at 459.
180. See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Others suggest that Holmes may have
also acted out of concern for the low supply of cleaner burning coal. See
FISCHEL, supra note 153, at 25, 35 (noting the Supreme Court "must surely
have been aware of' the shortage of anthracite coal (the target of the Kohler
Act) caused by long unionized workforce strikes that ended about three
months before the opinion issued). Still others suggest Holmes merely mis-
read the legislative purpose of the statute, felt it reflected a private dispute,
and "tacked on" broader language at the urging of Chief Justice Taft. See
Byrne, supra note 44, at 99.
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mental intent of legal actors" that characterized the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries in American law. 181
B. LOCHNER INCOGNITO? DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
ABANDONMENT OF ECONOMIC ISSUE DEFERENCE
1. Distrust and Its Implications
The inspection of the legislature's motives behind its eco-
nomic regulations in Lochner v. New York caused Justice
Holmes to write, "[A] constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the or-
ganic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire."182
Holmes's dissenting view ultimately won out; Lochner is "a now
widely vilified case."18 3 In denouncing the Lochner era, one
Court stated, "[We do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh
the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy
which it expresses offends the public welfare."18 4
Yet, some argue that "the broad conception of the Takings
Clause that Justice Scalia and a majority of the current Court
have adopted embodies a strict form of substantive due process"
reminiscent of the Lochner era.185 To understand this revival,
181. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 177, at 523 (noting the birth of
"meeting of the minds" in contract law, mens rea in criminal law, tort law's
"gradations of liability (including punitive liability) based upon the actor's
state of mind" and the use of legislative records to evaluate legislative intent).
182. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
183. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTs 272 (2d ed. 1999).
184. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952); see also
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926) ("We have noth-
ing to do with the question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordi-
nances. If they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is
to the ballot-not the courts." (quoting State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So.
440,444 (La. 1923))).
185. YARBROUGH, supra note 175, at 120. Indeed, the substantive due pro-
cess filter on the Court's takings jurisprudence has not gone unnoticed by
members of Congress. Id. at 35 ("Senator Biden could see little difference be-
tween the current Court's approach to regulatory takings and the decisions of
the Lochner era .... ."). Justice Stevens agrees. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "ap-
plied the same kind of substantive due process analysis more frequently iden-
tified with [Lochner]"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using the words of Justice Marshall to suggest
the majority opinion harkened back to Lochner). Yet, one frequent member of
the majority expresses some concern toward this trend. See E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The imprecision of
our regulatory takings doctrine does open the door to normative considerations
about the wisdom of government decisions."); see also John D. Echeverria, A
2002]
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one must recognize that the Lochner Court possessed a distrust
of government that fueled its views on regulations. 186 This
view appears to be shared by at least some members of the
Rehnquist Court, especially in the area of property regula-
tion.187 If the Court follows the lead of some members of the
Ninth Circuit, this distrust may influence its decision in Tahoe-
Sierra.188
Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [News & Analysis] 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11112, 11119-21 (Sept. 2001) (discussing, under
the heading "The Partial Taking Theory," how the Rehnquist Court struggles
with the "due process-like inquiry").
186. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 ("[Mlany of the laws of this character, while
passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protect-
ing the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.").
187. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2468 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (likening a government agency of Rhode Island to a
"thief clothed with the indicia of title"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12 ("[Tihe
legislature has recited a harm-preventing justification for its action.... We
think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful
harm-preventing characterizations.").
188. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial for re-
hearing en banc) ("I emphasize [plaintiffs land] 'might' [have future value],
because so-called temporary moratoria have a habit of living beyond their
purported termination dates."). Judge Kozinski further implied that adopting
consecutive moratoria constituted a "scheme" that allows government to
"evade" paying landowners compensation for takings. See id. California may
be a particular target of the Court: Despite the limited, remedial question be-
fore the Court in First English, Justice O'Connor queried in oral arguments,
[There are some horror stories out there of local governments inten-
tionally running [building permits] through the mill indefinitely in a
jurisdiction like California, with full recognition that if they lose on
one they can make a minor modification of the requirement and go
again and effectively deprive people forever of any use.
Now, whats an owner to do?
Transcript of Oral Argument, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1189), 1987 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 188 at
*49 (name of Justice added). Perhaps anticipating the Court's views, one of
the briefs amici curiae before the Rehnquist Court in Tahoe-Sierra encourages
the Court to "deliver an unmistakable message to TRPA and the Ninth Circuit
that no instrumentality of government is beyond the reach of the Constitu-
tion." See Brief Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation & California Asso-
ciation of Realtors, Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002) (not-
ing prior Court action against the Ninth Circuit under the heading "The
Opinion of the Ninth Circuit Below Is Merely the Latest in a Line of Decisions
in Which That Court Has Deferred to TRPA's Regulatory Mission, Effectively
Insulating the Agency from Constitutional Constraints Under the Fifth
Amendment"), 2001 WL 1082473, at *11.
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2. The Melding of Substantive Due Process and Takings
Analysis
Oddly, the Rehnquist Court's authority for greater scrutiny
of local land use decisions traces back to a 1980 case, Agins v.
City of Tiburon, a case in which the Court held the governmen-
tal regulation at issue did not take private property.189 As dis-
cussed in Part I.C.2., one of the two prongs of the takings test
established in Agins argues that a taking should be found if the
law "does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests."190 The Agins Court cited as support for this takings test
a 1928 substantive due process case in which no takings issue
was even before the Court.191
Stranger still, Justice Stevens, a leading critic of the
Court's mingling of substantive due process and takings analy-
sis, affirmed the Agins substantive due process prong in Key-
stone Bituminous.192 In an effort to save a subsidence statute
similar to that attacked by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, Jus-
tice Stevens conducted a review of the purpose of the statute
using the Agins test and found the statute passed muster. 193 In
saving the statute, Stevens used the substantive due process
prong of the Agins test to announce the public purpose of the
law outweighed the private loss. 194 He also, however, opened
the door for other members of the Court, less deferential to lo-
cal regulators, to apply heightened review to land use regula-
tions under the guise of the Takings Clause. 195
3. Private Property Rights and Revisionist History
The infiltration of substantive due process into the Court's
takings analysis allows the Court to engage its "particular eco-
nomic theory" in determining whether compensation is due
landowners, like those in Tahoe-Sierra.196 This allowance may
189. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
190. Id. at 260.
191. Id. (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
192. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
485-90 (1987).
193. See id. at 485-93.
194. See id.; see also MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 2.15, at 33 (noting that
the Keystone "test protects land use regulation from taking attacks by inject-
ing an emphasis on governmental purpose that is also required by substantive
due process doctrine").
195. See infra Part mH.B.3.
196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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explain why "the Rehnquist Court has been activist in defining
when government has 'taken' private property and owes its
owner compensation." 197 Beginning with Lucas, the Rehnquist
Court's activism has been one-sided: The government defen-
dants have lost every takings case brought before the Court. 198
This phenomenon largely reflects the Court's conservative
bloc's "[treatment of] property rights as beyond state control."199
The unprecedented theory embraced in Lucas suggests
that the "right" to some valuable use of land preempts govern-
ment regulation; therefore, a landowner's claim that govern-
ment violated this "right" must undergo scrutiny redolent of
Lochner.2°° To secure this new theory in the foothold of time,
Justice Scalia wrote in Lucas that to not impose such scrutiny
would be "inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in
the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture."2ol This statement revises constitutional history be-
yond support. It is said that to those who framed the United
States Constitution "[g]overnment was thought to be by its na-
ture hostile to human liberty and happiness, and especially
susceptible to corruption and despotism" and needed to be "con-
fined to serving those needs of the people that could not other-
wise be satisfied. 202 Yet, from the time James Madison drafted
the Fifth Amendment to 1922, the idea of a non-possessory
regulatory taking did not exist.20 3 Further, as one scholar
notes, "If someone as articulate as Madison had wanted to re-
strict the regulation of land use.., he would have done so un-
197. GOTrLIEB, supra note 177, at 61 (noting also that the Court "appears
to follow ... wealth maximization" as its economic theory).
198. See Marcia Coyle, Landowners Win Right to Attack Rules, NATL L.J.,
July 16, 2001, at Al.
199. GOTrLIEB, supra note 177, at 144. Some proponents of greater private
property rights openly gloat over the Rehnquist CourVs "trend of rulings
strengthening the position of property owners under the takings clause...
particularly in the area of environmental protection." Brief Amici Curiae of
the American Farm Bureau Federation et al., Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S.
argued Jan. 7, 2002), 2001 WL 1077926, at *4. They further note that this
"trend began in 1987 with [the Rehnquist] Court's decision in First English."
Id.
200. See YARBROUGH, supra note 175, at 120.
201. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
202. SIEGAN, supra note 47, at 51 (emphasis added).
203. This Comment argues it did not exist in 1922 either-except in Justice
Brandeis's view of Pennsylvania Coal's holding. See supra notes 165-74 and
accompanying text.
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mistakably."2°4 In fact, Congress rejected an earlier proposal
by Madison to proclaim "[tihat government is instituted and
ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people... with the
right of... using property."20 5
4. Recent Contradictory Case Law
In fact, Lucas's elevation of non-possessory property right
devaluations to categorical takings belies contemporary treat-
ment of takings law as well. For example, in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,206 Justice Marshall sug-
gested that had New York's law merely required landlords to
provide, and thus own, cable television equipment, the law
might have survived a constitutional challenge. 207 Instead the
law authorized "permanent occupation of the landlord's prop-
erty by a third party.20 8 The Court noted that if the landlord
had owned the cable, she "need not incur the burden of obtain-
ing the [cable] company's cooperation in moving the cable."209
Thus, the Fifth Amendment mandated compensation for Lo-
retto because New York's law imposed a "burden" on the land-
lord's right to exclude third parties.210 In other words, the
Court considered the regulation a possessory "governmental ac-
tivity."211 The Court viewed most regulations (those not physi-
cally occupying property) as "nonpossessory governmental ac-
tivit[ies]" that remained valid until proven otherwise under the
Penn Central test.212
Justice Marshall's note foreshadowed the Rehnquist
Court's position in Yee v. City of Escondido,213 in which Justice
O'Connor stated that government-imposed rent control did not
constitute a burden on a landlord's possessory interests because
the decision to rent was voluntary.214 That is, the landlord's
204. Hart, supra note 48, at 114.
205. SIEGAN, supra note 47, at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting James Madi-
son from 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
206. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The facts of this case are discussed elsewhere in
this Comment. See supra note 55.
207. 458 U.S. at 440 n.19.
208. Id. at 440.
209. Id. at 440 n.19.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 440.
212. Id.
213. 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992).
214. See id. Noted land use scholars seem to differ on whether the Jus-
tice's comments represented the holding of the Court or merely dictum. See
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right to exclude remained intact and therefore no physical in-
vasion occurred. 215 The Yee opinion drew no dissents. Further,
at times the right to exclude itself seems malleable.2 16 Before
ascending to Chief Justice, even Justice Rehnquist appeared
willing to allow state infringement on the right to exclude if the
burden imposed on the property owner was temporary.217 He
reflected a long held view of a dynamic police power that re-
sponds to "'the growing complexity of our civilization" by
"limit[ing] individual activities .... "within reasonable bounds,
to meet the changing conditions." 218
C. THE CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION IN
TAKINGS LAW AND THE CONSEQUENCES
At first glance, the Rehnquist Court's heightened scrutiny
of governmental actions affecting economic interests in prop-
erty appears to be offset by its allowance of an affirmative de-
fense for restrictions similar to public nuisance actions.219
Some attribute the Court's exception to the economic categori-
cal taking as consistent with a strong belief in state authority
under federalism.220 As Palazzolo demonstrates, however, the
EAGLE, supra note 29, § 12-2(c)(1), at 984 ("Justice O'Connor wrote some in-
teresting and perhaps prophetic dicta."); MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 2.14, at
31 ("The Court held a taking by physical occupation had not occurred, and that
a claim of regulatory taking was not properly before the Court.").
215. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 539.
216. See ROTUNDA, supra note 167, at 530 (noting that the Court, in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980), affirmed a
California Supreme Court ruling that the California Constitution protected
speech and petitioning in private commercial shopping centers against a tak-
ings challenge). In PruneYard, Justice Rehnquist commented, "[Tihe fact that
they may have 'physically invaded' appellants' property cannot be viewed as
determinative." 447 U.S. at 84. The Court relied on the state supreme court's
allowance for the private property owner to set up "time, place, and manner
regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial func-
tions." Id. at 83. Thus, the Supreme Court held valid a state constitutional
provision that authorized occupation of private property, subject to the prop-
erty owner being able to limit the burden imposed, without just compensation.
See id. at 83-84.
217. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84.
218. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926) (quoting
City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (Ill. 1925)).
219. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (noting
the government "identif[ies] background principles of nuisance and property
law" that support the restriction); supra text accompanying note 112.
220. See Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings
Puzzle, in TAKINGS 107, 110-11 (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
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Court intends to narrowly construe this defense.221 Palazzolo
rejects many post-Lucas lower court rulings that held state
statutes regulating environmental and land use harms consti-
tute "background principles. 222
Concomitant with limiting non-compensable nuisance-
prevention statutes, Supreme Court decisions also show a trend
toward limiting common law nuisance actions filed against re-
gional pollution sources. 223 For instance, in City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, then Justice Rehnquist announced that the Clean
Water Act "supplant[ed]" Illinois's federal common nuisance
law claim to stop pollution of Lake Michigan by Wisconsin cit-
ies.224 Six years later, the Court held the Act also preempted a
Vermont landowner's state nuisance law claim (on behalf of
himself and other property owners) to stop pollution in Lake
Champlain by a New York pollution source.225 These cases ef-
fectively "slam[med] the door on most federal common law ac-
tions.1226
In part, the Court's rulings reflect the failure of common
law nuisance actions to adequately address the regional effects
of localized pollution, such as the aggregate pollution effect on
Lake Tahoe of particularized private development. 227 As a re-
sult, federal environmental laws largely supplanted the envi-
ronmental nuisance action.228 The effect of Lucas limits the
221. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
222. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1251-52 (D. Nev. 1999) (noting that before Lucas "most
courts ... appear to have accepted.., that 'newly legislated or decreed' re-
strictions on land use can also constitute 'background principles' of state law
for this purpose" (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029)). The district court in Ta-
hoe-Sierra listed seven cases supporting this view. Id.
223. See, e.g., Intl Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (pre-
empting "state law to the extent that the state law is applied to an out-of-state
point source"); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981) (holding
no federal common law remedy available).
224. 451 U.S. at 329.
225. Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 493-94 (noting that "if affected States were
allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a single point source, the
inevitable result would be a serious interference with the... 'full purposes
and objectives of Congress'" (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985))).
226. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 45, at 101. But see New England Legal
Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (distinguishing
the Clean Air Act (not necessarily preemptive of common law) from the Clean
Water Act (preemptive)).
227. See Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-33.
228. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
20021
948 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:913
statutory tools available to legislatures to protect regional wa-
ters and the people they support from what would otherwise
constitute public nuisances. 229 In addition, Palazzolo may also
call into question the very legitimacy of the nuisance per ac-
cidens.230 Palazzolo also indicates that the Court views the nui-
sance defense as frozen in time.231 In fact, a majority of the
Court appears to engage in a little temporal severance of its
own, chopping from the venerable and evolving continuum of
takings law a particular set of "background principles."232
229. This trend forgets why statutory controls supplanted common nui-
sance actions:
"The practical effect of [Lucas] ... is to transfer authority from
legislatures to courts. Essentially, it implies that legislative judg-
ments of harm are not legitimate, but judge-made judgments are.
This transfer is a concern because serious environmental harms, such
as the ozone hole or degradation of the Chesapeake Bay, often arise
from many small, seemingly safe uses of property that only together
cause great harm. Environmental protection began with judge-made
law, but shifted to legislative statutes long ago precisely because
courts have difficulty recognizing and regulating such diffuse sources
of harm."
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1206 (quoting Letter from Timothy D.
Searchinger to Members of the Environmental Defense Fund 4 (Oct. 1992)).
230. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2001) (noting
that "[a] regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background principle for
some owners but not for others"). This appears to call into question the
Euclidean "pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard" concept. Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place .... ."). Euclidean zoning recognizes that some
activities, not offensive in some places, may be harmful in other places. See id.
at 387-88. Thus, one owner may build a factory on industrial zoned land while
another owner wishing to build the same factory on residential zoned land will
be prohibited. See GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING
TERMS, supra note 22, at 94 (defining "Euclidean zoning" to require segregated
uses).
231. See supra notes 103, 113 and accompanying text.
232. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463-64 (rejecting the idea that a 1971
coastal protection statute-in effect twelve years at the time the landowner
filed the complaint---could, standing alone, serve as a "background principle");
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (dismissing
abruptly Justice Blackmun's notion that the majority misunderstands the
original intent of the Takings Clause and noting "[tihat is largely true, but en-
tirely irrelevant" because the understanding of the clause as applied to the
states dates back only to 1922 (Pennsylvania Coal) or 1897 (Chicago, Burling-
ton and Quincy)). Thus, the Court's "background principles" might be those
existing between 1922 and 1971. One respected dictionary falling between
these dates, however, merely adopts a broad definition of nuisance: "An offen-
sive, annoying, unpleasant, or obnoxious thing or practice; a cause or source of
annoyance, especially a continuing or repeating invasion or disturbance of an-
other's right" including Blackstone's "Anything that worketh hurt, inconven-
ience, or damage." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1672 (2d ed.
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As part of a broader movement to reduce state control over
private property, Lucas, as informed by Palazzolo, actually rep-
resents a private rights crusade clothed as support for state
common law. In reality, the Court's current takings analysis
undermines majoritarian will as expressed through state and
local land use controls.233 As such, it reflects the Madisonian
fear of the egalitarian redistribution of landed gentry wealth.234
Other Framers shared this view, but, as noted above, even the
Framers rejected Madison's preferred Takings Clause language
guaranteeing "the right" of "using property."235
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUITS DECISION IN TAHOE-SIERRA
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
As Part III explains, the landowners' suit in Tahoe-Sierra
faces a more favorable takings terrain today than when they
filed their suit against the TRPA in 1984.236 The Supreme
Court looks and acts much different now than in 1984; the U.S.
Senate confirmed six of the nine Justices currently on the
Court subsequent to the initiation of the suit.237 In the inter-
vening seventeen years since the filing of the suit the Court
crafted a number of decisions favoring property owners in tak-
ings analyses including those in First English, Lucas, and
Palazzolo.238 In addition, as discussed in Part III, the Court in-
1950) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMM0ENTARIES *216); see also Ren-
ken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 175-76 (D. Or. 1963) (using
the 1950 edition of Webster's New International Dictionary to construe "nui-
sance" broadly). Further, since the Rehnquist Court's view of the 1922 Penn-
sylvania Coal case essentially was not followed (or did not exist) until 1978,
what the Court means by "background principles" remains a mystery. See su-
pra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
233. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 1096 ("In the 25 years
since [restrictions on sprawl development in Oregon were] adopted, various
interest groups have sought its repeal or dismantlement by the legislature or
by public referendum. They have regularly been defeated. Four times Oregon
voters have rejected changing the system in statewide referenda.").
234. See id. at 1103.
235. SIEGAN, supra note 47, at 28 (emphasis added).
236. See Jordan C. Kahn, Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, at
http//www.trpa.orgNews/Legal/tspc.html (last visited March 29, 2002).
237. See ROTUNDA, supra note 167, at lix.
238. See supra Part I.C.3-5; see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537
(1998) (holding that a retroactive health benefit liability law constituted a tak-
ing); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that a
negligible interest used for legal aid was still the property of the principle
owner for takings purposes); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994)
(rejecting the city's requirement that a bicycle path be dedicated without com-
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creasingly views government land use regulations with dis-
trust, reviews such actions with greater scrutiny, and suggests
compensation is due for harm-preventing restrictions not based
on narrowly construed "background principles. 2 39 The Ninth
Circuit properly placed moratoria within the letter of the Su-
preme Court's holdings in First English and Lucas, but did not
address the high court's likely Lochneresque approach to
Tahoe-Sierra. This flaw may lead to its reversal.
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY HELD THE MORATORIA IN
TAHOE-SIERRA DID NOT CONSTITUTE TAKINGS BASED ON THE
REHNQUIST COURT'S HOLDINGS IN FIRSTENGLISH AND LUCAS
Five members of the Ninth Circuit claim the panel in Ta-
hoe-Sierra lifted its opinion in large part from Justice Stevens's
dissent in First English.240 The accusers slyly juxtapose seven
sentences from three pages of Stevens's dissent with five sen-
tences from four pages of the panel's decision and proclaim
foul.241 As explained above, however, the remedial question be-
fore the Court in First English makes much of that opinion dic-
tum. 242 Indeed, the accusers edit a portion of the First English
dissent where Justice Stevens addresses the error of the
Court's dictum concerning conceptual severance. 243 That sev-
eral sentences plucked out of several pages of two opinions
dealing with the same general topic bear similarities seems of
little consequence. 244
One scholar argues that Tahoe-Sierra skews the "principles
pensation); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987) (hold-
ing a state cannot condition a building permit on the grant of public beach ac-
cess without compensation).
239. See supra Part Ill.
240. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228
F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1000-01.
242. See MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 8.24, at 362 ("The Court's holding in
First English is limited to the compensation remedy."); supra text accompany-
ing note 142.
243. Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 1000.
244. See Thomas E. Roberts, Moratoria as Categorical Regulatory Takings:
What First English and Lucas Say and Don't Say, [News & Analysis] 31 Envtl.
L. Rep. 11037, 11042-43 (Sept. 2001) (noting under the heading "The Ninth
Circuit's Appropriate Reliance on the Stevens' Dissent" that the court "simply
used the dissent's [still viable] general idea that present use rights ought not
be severed").
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underlying" First English's dictum and thus represents flawed
reasoning by the Ninth Circuit.245 He suggests these principles
include the "vindication of temporal segmentation."246 On re-
mand in First English, however, the California Court of Ap-
peals held no taking occurred, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.247 This denial calls into question the
theory that the Supreme Court found temporal segmentation a
legitimate exercise in takings analysis. In fact, the first sen-
tence of First English states and limits its holding to "the time"
while the law is in effect and "before it is finally determined
that the regulation constitutes a 'taking."248 Thus the First
English Court does not sever or take a slice out of the fee inter-
est pie, but simply recognizes the "wholeness" of the pie by "re-
placing" legally a part of the pie that was never cut into pieces
in the first place. Thus, to suggest First English vindicates
temporal severance is at best a misuse of the temporal sever-
ance concept and at worst inapposite to the case's holding.
Moreover, just seventeen days after deciding First English,
the Court handed down another takings case in which the
Court appears to affirm that temporary burdens placed on the
revered right to exclude do not constitute takings.249 This opin-
ion comports with the final case of the 1987 takings triad, Key-
stone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis, where the Court reaf-
firmed its rejection of conceptual severance.2 0 First English
adds (or subtracts) little or nothing to the whole parcel rule set
forth in Penn Central. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit properly
rejected the landowners' claim that First English mandated
245. See Eagle, supra note 72, at 11232 ("In the course of framing the ap-
propriate remedy, First English said much about what constitutes a tempo-
rary taking.").
246. See id. at 11232-33 (listing four such principles under the heading
"First English Principles").
247. MANDELKER, supra note 29, § 12.06 & n.51, at 488.
248. First English, 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987). Interestingly, contempo-
rary reviews of First English by affected parties expressed no concern about
the decision's effect on temporary prospective land use restrictions. See
RicHARD J. RODDEWIG & CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN, RESPONDING TO THE
TAKINGS CHALLENGE: A GUIDE FOR OFFIcIALS AND PLANNERS 6 (1989).
249. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 n.1 (1987) (not-
ing that a 1980 case was "not inconsistent with" per se physical occupation
takings "since there the owner had already opened his property to the general
public, and in addition permanent access was not required"); supra notes 216-
18 and accompanying text.
250. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987).
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conceptual severance.251
As discussed above, the landowners did not seek review
under the Penn Central test; they claimed a total economic tak-
ing under the standard set forth in Lucas.5 2 Having dismissed
First English as varying the whole parcel rule, the Ninth Cir-
cuit proceeded to set the numerator and denominator as ap-
plied to the landowners' claim during the moratoria.253 The
court properly set the numerator as the unrestricted value of
the parcel during the moratoria. 254 The court adjudged the de-
nominator as encompassing the numerator value plus coinci-
dent future use value.255
This approach seems reasonable given that the court found
an absence of any "evidence that [the landowners] anticipated
that the [moratoria] would continue indefinitely."256 Further, a
thirty-two month delay in the use of one's property (with the
future use of the entire parcel remaining) seems less harsh an
economic burden than those resulting from previous Supreme
Court cases upholding restrictions that permanently and sig-
nificantly devalued land without compensation. 5 7 The finding
of the district court that "the average holding time of a lot in
the Tahoe area between lot purchase and home construction is
twenty-five years" bolsters the claim that much value remains
subsequent to the thirty-two month moratoria 5 8 Finally, the
evidence at the district court supports that this future use gave
251. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216
F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2000).
252. See supra Part II.B.
253. See Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 781.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 782.
257. Assume, arguendo, that following the lifting of the moratoria, the av-
erage landowner retained her property for another seventy-six months. The
thirty-two month period would have restricted the value of her land use inter-
est by 30%. Moreover, this does not include the present value of future use
exceeding the nine years of ownership. By contrast, the permanent devalua-
tions upheld by the Court in the past include a higher percentage loss. See,
e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 515
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting the parties stipulated a 50% loss);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 117, 138 (1978) (sup-
porting a bar on fifty-three of fifty-five stories of use and about 75% of poten-
tial value); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926)
(upholding a 75% loss); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 414 (1915)
(upholding a 92.5% loss).
258. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Nev. 1999).
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the owners present value: The government's appraiser testified
that during the moratoria, some sales of similarly restricted
properties did take place.2 9
The Ninth Circuit grounded its opinion in the whole parcel
rule because First English did not require otherwise and be-
cause the economic devaluation of the present value of the land
was no greater than that allowed in many past Supreme Court
cases.260 As such the Ninth Circuit properly held the moratoria
in Tahoe-Sierra did not constitute takings. The Supreme
Court, however, may impose a stricter review than that justi-
fied under First English and Lucas, one involving substantive
due process. 261
B. EVEN UNDER A STRICTER REVIEW INFLUENCED BY DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS, THE MORATORIA IN TAHOE-SIERRA Do NOT
CONSTITUTE TAKINGS
The trend, identified in Part III, in the Rehnquist Court's
takings decisions of greater scrutiny of laws restricting land
uses may be attributed in part to the heavy reliance on regula-
tory measures, versus incentives, to diminish environmentally
harmful private landowner behavior.262 The Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact provides an example of Congressional reli-
ance on regulatory measures. 263 Congress granted the TRPA
broad regulatory powers and duties when it enacted the Com-
pact.264 Still, Congress, just four days after enacting the Com-
pact, passed a companion incentive bill, the Santini-Burton Act,
that appropriated thirty million dollars for land purchases in
the Tahoe Basin and established a mechanism for funding fu-
ture purchases. 265 This legislative history calls into question
259. Id. at 1242.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
261. See supra Part IL.
262. See DUKEMINLER & KRIER, supra note 24, at 777 ("To date, virtually
all legislative-administrative efforts to control environmental problems--at
any level of government-have taken the form of regulation.").
263. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. VI(a),
94 Stat. 3242 (1980) (mandating that the agency develop regulation standards
"including but not limited to" seventeen land uses and their effects).
264. Seeid. atart. VI.
265. See Santini-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 96-586, §§ 1(b), 2(d), 3, 94 Stat.
3381 (1980) (earmarking 85% of the proceeds from federal land sales around
Las Vegas for "the acquisition of environmentally sensitive lands in the Lake
Tahoe Basin").
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the characterization, by some members of the Ninth Circuit, of
the government activity under the Compact as a "scheme"
where government "evade[s]" paying landowners for bona fide
takings.266
The Ninth Circuit opinion, however, gave little attention to
the "intent" behind the TRPA imposed moratoria and thus
leaves only the monologue of the property rights movement to
fill the awaiting ears extended by a number of the Justices of
the Court.267 The Ninth Circuit's failure does not reflect a lack
of good will or rational behavior on the part of the TRPA.
To the contrary, significant evidence suggests that the
moratoria should withstand even Lochner-like review by the
Court. First, the TRPA would not exist if not for the continued
demand of the property owners in the Lake Tahoe Basin, dat-
266. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial for re-
hearing en banc); supra note 188 and accompanying text. Further, if Congress
members acted in the Lake Tahoe Basin as "thie[ves] clothed with the indicia
of title" (Justice Scalia's portrayal of the Rhode Island government in Palaz-
zolo), at least their actions resemble honorable thieves, stealing from the rich
(who buy land around booming Las Vegas) and giving to the "poor" (those own-
ing land with diminished value around Lake Tahoe). See Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2468 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
267. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation & California
Association of Realtors, Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002)
(noting the "oftentimes misguided, or in some cases even hostile, actions that
local governmental entities and courts have taken with regard to landowners'
constitutional rights"), 2001 WL 1082473 at *2; Brief Amicus Curiae of the In-
stitute for Justice, Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002) (call-
ing the treatment of the landowners a "modem version of Bleak House, in
which the actions of regional planning commissioners made the nineteenth-
century English Probate Court appear the model of dispatch"), 2001 WL
1082466 at *2; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation, Ta-
hoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S argued Jan. 7, 2002) ("It is an unfortunate fact
that land use agencies often abuse their powers... ."), 2001 WL 1077936 at
*6; Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Home Builders, Tahoe-
Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002) (noting that "moratoria are of-
ten a political tool rather than one used selectively by planners" and are "na-
kedly political efforts to strip away the property rights of the few for the satis-
faction of the many"), 2001 WL 1077932 at *5-6; Brief Amici Curiae of the
American Farm Bureau Federation et al., Tahoe-Sierra, No. 00-1167 (U.S. ar-
gued Jan. 7, 2002) ("[The Ninth Circuit engaged in a rescue operation to
shield regulators from shouldering the financial consequences of their ac-
tions."), 2001 WL 1077926 at *9. Before the Court, the landowners' counsel
distinguished permit application delays and building moratoria; he character-
ized the "purpose" of the permit process as one that "enable[s] use" whereas
the "intent" of moratoria "is a conscious and total prohibition on use." Tran-
script of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 16-17.
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ing at least back to 1956, for regional planning efforts. 268 In
fact, the teeth of the TRPA's powers would not exist today
without the failure of toothless predecessor powers to save
Lake Tahoe from hasty, unplanned development. 269 Decades of
efforts to balance unregulated human development and the
lake's survival came and went without success before Nevada
and California asked Congress to intervene in 1969.270 When it
did intervene, Congress established a weak coordinating
agency and waited ten years for positive results.271 None
came-the lake's health deteriorated.2 72 Only upon findings by
the California and Nevada legislatures that it was "necessary
to halt temporarily works of development in the region" did
Congress give the TRPA more powers to restrict land use.273
Consequently, the TRPA as it exists today reflects not irrespon-
sible legislative activity, but reasoned, responsive law-making.
Second, the record shows that the TRPA knew that in the
absence of the moratoria, Congress's aim to protect Lake Tahoe
would be subverted by landowners rushing to build before
proper development controls could be put in place.274 Thus, the
TRPA, faced with temporarily restricting the landowners' use
of the land or ignoring a congressional mandate, chose the for-
mer path.275 Third, even the district court, in finding takings
268. See STRONG, supra note 4, at 126.
269. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact: Hearing on H.R. 8235 Before the
House Comm. on Administrative Law and Gov't Relations, 96th Cong. 55-56
(1980) (statement of Hon. Jim Santini, Rep. of Nev.).
270. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
272. See Strong, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that during the 1970s traffic
increased 80%, water clarity decreased 6-13%, and urban development in-
creased 78%, while algal concentrations in the lake increased by 150% in the
period between 1969-75).
273. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. VI(c),
94 Stat. 3242, 3243 (1980).
274. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999). According to the court,
[Ailmost everyone in the Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a
crackdown on development was in the works. The Tahoe area experi-
enced a glut of construction in the years just before the Compact was
amended in 1980, as worried property owners attempted to build
while they still could.
Id.
275. See id. at 1233. But cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22,
at 51 (recording Chief Justice Rehnquist as noting, "the fact that [the TRPA
Board Members] were instructed to do it by Congress doesn't make it any
more or less of a taking" (name of Justice added)).
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occurred, questioned whether the moratoria could have been
lifted any sooner considering Congress's directive.27 6
C. EVEN IF THE REHNQUIST COURT DETERMINES THE
MORATORIA CONSTITUTE TAKINGS, THE COURT SHOULD FIND
THE MORATORIA WITHIN THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION
Despite their stunted growth, and further, despite the
Rehnquist Court's apparent denial of their august history, nui-
sance "background principles" support the moratoria imposed
by the TRPA and should be held an exception to any takings
found by the Court.277 As mentioned in Parts I.B.1 and III.C,
the complexity of environmental problems explains why statu-
tory nuisance law supplanted many common law nuisance ac-
tions.278 Statutory nuisance law, in practice, truncated common
law nuisance development; it did not, however, bar the possibil-
ity of future application of old principles to modern cases of first
impression.2 79
Moratoria, however, need not be viewed as substantive re-
sponses to nuisances; moratoria simply serve as the procedural
tools of a government agency and act much like a judge's pre-
liminary injunction pending a ruling on a public nuisance ac-
276. See id. at 1235-36; Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-
551, art. VI(a), 94 Stat. 3242 (1980).
277. The district court in Tahoe-Sierra noted that "pollution of water" gen-
erally constitutes a nuisance, but that the case law did not support finding a
nuisance on the facts presented because of the small amount of pollution each
landowner contributed to the overall deterioration of the lake. See 34 F. Supp.
2d at 1252-54. Importantly, the district court cited cases from 1884-1961, all
before the general rise in environmental awareness and subsequent legislative
enactments. See id. at 1253; supra note 46; discussion supra Part III.C. This
provides an example of how common nuisance law ends where statutory law
begins-however, this does not mean that the background principles associ-
ated would have nothing to say about nuisance-like activity after 1961. See
GARRETP, supra note 38, at 112 (construing English nuisance law in the late
1800s as allowing a public nuisance "proceedingfl" even in the absence of
damages "on the broad ground that the nuisance is an infringement of the law,
which tends to injure the public by interfering with the exercise of common
rights" (footnote omitted)).
278. See supra note 46; discussion supra Part III.C.
279. See, e.g., Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 868 (Fla.
2001) (using the Lucas nuisance exception to affirm the lower court's ruling
denying a takings challenge brought by a hotel owner after the City of Miami
declared his hotel a nuisance because of drug and prostitution related activity
occurring at the hotel); see also PROSSER, supra note 39, at 808 (noting "a
number of cases" applying public nuisance law to enjoin "urban street gangs
and gun manufacturers and distributors").
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tion.280 Understanding the legislative moratoria as analogous
to the judicial preliminary injunction necessarily removes both
from the takings analysis: Each stops private activity only until
a proper balancing of harms can be conducted. 28' In the case of
modern nuisance-like activities, the delay necessarily takes
longer than early nuisance cases.282 In fact, a judge enjoined
the TRPA in the Tahoe-Sierra dispute for over three years
pending more detailed environmental analysis, underscoring
the difficulty in quickly assessing the proper balance between
human development of land and the complex environmental
problems such activities create. 28 3
Finally, if a belief in wealth maximization provides the ba-
sis for the Rehnquist Court's takings direction, as some sug-
gest,284 the Court should uphold moratoria because they allow
governments the time to allocate scarce resources efficiently in
cases like Tahoe-Sierra.2 5 That is, without moratoria, legisla-
tures would be forced to enact more sweeping legislation and
attempt complex, fact-specific evaluations better left to the ex-
pertise of agencies. 286 The result of challenges to these broader
280. See GARRETT, supra note 38, at 363 (noting the preliminary injunction
should be granted only "when there is irreparable, or at least serious, mischief
to which the property may be exposed before the question of legal right can be
determined").
281. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 788 (defining a "pre-
liminary injunction" as "[a] temporary injunction issued before or during trial
to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance
to decide the case").
282. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37 (noting the 1984
TRPA plan was delayed by a court-ordered injunction for over three years).
283. See id. In this case, due to the complexities of the issues, the judge
essentially utilized the TRPA staff to assist him in balancing the harms that
more traditionally would be conducted solely by the court, by requiring TRPA
to prove its plan met the law's goals. See id.
284. GOTILIEB, supra note 177, at 61 (noting also that the Court "appears
to follow.., wealth maximization" as its economic theory).
285. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE EcONOMICS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NUISANCE LAw 1-2, 9, 11-12 (1992) (reviewing wealth
maximization principles in nuisance law).
286. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (Milwaukee
II) (noting that the use of common law "in the face of congressional legislation
supplanting it is peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollu-
tion control.... doubtless the reason Congress vested authority to administer
the [Clean Water] Act in administrative agencies possessing the necessary ex-
pertise"). Agencies also possess more expertise than the judiciary. See
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 177, at 313 (noting that agencies are "better in-
formed about the statutory history and the practicality of competing policies
than courts are").
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statutes might be greater invalidation (under substantive due
process actions) of necessary protections for the environments
that support human existence. Such a result would be contrary
to the power of the sovereign to protect its citizens from harm,
a power the Framers imbedded in the Fifth Amendment. 287
The Ninth Circuit's decision correctly interprets this venerable
body of law and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For most of the history of this nation, the Supreme Court
contained its review of government restrictions of private land
within the bounds of the Takings Clause. It interpreted the
scope of the clause in light of original intent and consistency
with ancient principles of property. In recent decades, the rise
of environmental pollution concerns brought a commensurate
increase in government regulations. In an unprecedented re-
sponse, the Rehnquist Court has revamped a bygone era of in-
tense government scrutiny by the courts and carefully
shrouded this scrutiny in its takings analysis.
Despite the Court's increasingly cynical view of govern-
ment actions, however, the Ninth Circuit's denial of temporal
severance and its denial of the landowners' takings claims de-
serve the Court's affirmation for the reasons set forth in Part
IV. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency should not be re-
quired to compensate landowners for the moratoria periods.
The Supreme Court's past precedent and the nuisance excep-
tion to takings, even under a Lochneresque heightened review
of government intent, cry out for affirmation of Tahoe-Sierra.
Let justice be done.
287. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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